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OVER-DETENTION: ASYLUM-SEEKERS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND PATH
DEPENDENCY
INTRODUCTION

W

e have seen this problem before.1 We have examined the
shocking case studies of asylum-seekers detained categorically and for prolonged periods of time before.2 We have
watched the United States shirk their international legal commitments to ensure the dignity and humanity of refugees before.3 Yet despite the ongoing outcry of non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)4 and legal scholars,5 and despite recent
attempts by the United States government to improve the immigration system,6 little has been done to adequately improve
the plight of detained asylum-seekers desperate to avoid removal to a country in which they are likely to face persecution.7
1. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Comprehensive Immigration Reform in El Paso, Texas (May 10, 2011) [hereinafter
Remarks
by
the
President]
(transcript
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/10/remarks-presidentcomprehensive-immigration-reform-el-paso-texas) (“[T]he truth is, we’ve often wrestled with the politics of who is and who isn’t allowed to come into
this country. This debate is not new.”).
2. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, Excessive Use of Detention, in AMERICAN
JUSTICE THROUGH IMMIGRANTS’ EYES 59, 59–72 (2004) [hereinafter A.B.A.].
3. See, e.g., Bridget Kessler, In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing . . . No Problem? A Closer Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process Standards
of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 24 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 571 (2009).
4. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS:
SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON (2009) [hereinafter SEEKING
PROTECTION],
available
at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf.
5. See, e.g., A.B.A., supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with
the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Exercising
Prosecutorial
Discretion],
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
7. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6 (establishing prosecutorial discretion policy), with Julia Preston, Obama Policy on Deporting Used Unevenly, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2011, at A16 (alleging that despite the factors to be considered in light of the prosecutorial discretion policy
some groups see less benefits than others).
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Against a backdrop of domestic concern—exacerbated by the
attacks of 9/118—that immigration carries inherent risks, the
United States has detained non-citizens of all types for a variety of reasons9 and pursuant to broad legal mandates.10 While
there are admittedly some conditions under which detention
can be a legitimate governmental function, many countries often subject entrants to detention that is “arbitrary” or “unnecessary” in violation of international human rights laws and
norms.11 In the United States, the decision to categorically detain asylum-seekers—despite the existence of potential solutions in the international community, including successful

8. Kevin Sullivan & Mary Jordan, Foreword to A.B.A., supra note 2, at v.
The horrific September 11, 2001 terror attacks on New York City
and Washington, D.C. fundamentally changed the way our nation of
immigrants views itself. Shameful episodes of anti-immigrant violence immediately after the attacks grabbed most of the headlines.
But the more significant shift has played out more quietly in federal
government offices where immigration policy is made. The United
States government, acting on a new urgency to control immigration
and American borders, has tightened an array of regulations that affect how people from other countries may enter or live in the United
States.
Id. While the 9/11 terror attacks perhaps intensified this fear, the concern
about the link between immigration and domestic terrorism may have begun
much earlier. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, Immigration Hurts City, New
Yorkers Say in Poll, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1993, at B4.
9. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF.OF IMMIGR.STAT. ANN. REP.,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter
ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS],
available
at
IMMIGRATION
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar2010.pdf (“Foreign nationals may be removable . . . for violations including
failure to abide by the terms and conditions of admission or engaging in
crimes such as violent crimes, document and benefit fraud, terrorist activity,
and drug smuggling.”). While this Note will hone in upon the detention of
refugees and asylum-seekers, it is important to remember that these groups
are just a portion of the non-citizen population detained each year. See id.
10. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (expedited removal and, thus,
mandatory detention, for all aliens arriving without having gone through the
proper immigration channels).
11. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Alternatives to Detention of
Asylum Seekers and Refugees, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. POLAS/2006/03 (Apr. 2006)
(by Ophelia Field & Alice Edwards) [hereinafter Alternatives to Detention]
(finding that many states presume detention for asylum-seekers despite contrary interpretations of international laws).
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NGO pilot efforts which use individualized risk-analysis12 and
“Alternatives to Detention”13 (“ATD”) programs—may amount
to unnecessary or arbitrary detention that violates international human rights law.14 The arbitrary and unnecessary nature of these detentions may have a particularly egregious impact on the class of asylum-seekers15 affected, where the depri12. Risk analysis is used in this Note to mean an individualized determination of a detained asylum-seeker’s eligibility for parole or release to an Alternatives to Detention program, which includes an assessment of that individual determining identity, risk of flight, potential for posing danger to the
community, or regarding any other justification for release. See SEEKING
PROTECTION, supra note 4, at 72–73.
13. “Alternatives to detention” is a term of art meaning an “alternative
means of increasing the appearance and compliance of individual asylum
seekers with asylum procedures and of meeting other legitimate concerns
which States have attempted to address . . . through recourse to detention.”
Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at ¶ 4. They will be discussed in
more depth throughout this Note.
14. See, e.g., UNHCR, Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty and Security of
Person and ‘Alternatives to Detention’ of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless
Persons and Other Migrants, 51–87, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/01.Rev.1 (Apr.
2011) (by Alice Edwards) [hereinafter Back to Basics]; Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 1–2 (presuming detention may violate international
law).
15. A subtle distinction exists between a refugee and an asylum-seeker;
the United States defines refugees as those seeking protection before they
arrive in the country while asylum-seekers are seeking protection after arriving in the United States. DANIEL C. MARTIN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STAT. ANN. FLOW REP., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2010, at 1,
4 (2011). The Department of Homeland Security further separates affirmative asylum-seekers, who apply for asylum at a port of entry or within one
year of arrival in the United States, from defensive asylum-seekers, who file
for asylum in order to avoid removal or those who are subject to expedited
removal. Id. at 4. In contrast, international discourse distinguishes asylumseekers from refugees on the basis that asylum-seekers “are individuals who
have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status
have not yet been determined,” that is, their cases are still pending. 2009
UNHCR Stat. Y.B. 13, http://www.unhcr.org/4ce532ff9.html. The distinction
is irrelevant for the purposes of this Note because the language within U.S.
statutes grants authorization to seek asylum to the same non-citizens as
those protected in the international definitions of “refugee.” Compare 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42) (2012) with Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees [Refugee Convention], art. 1, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 and Protocol to the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees [Protocol to Refugee Convention], Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. This Note will focus on defensive asylum-seekers
who announce their intention to seek asylum at the port of entry to the Unit-
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vation of liberty can exacerbate the traumas that led to their
flight from their country of origin in the first place.16
The United States has recognized that the immigration system needs work.17 In the detention context, the United States
has identified the need to incorporate risk analysis tools18 and
ATDs in order to improve the process.19 However, the steps the
United States has taken to develop and implement these tools
have significantly deviated from the recommendations of experts in the field20 and have failed thus far to bring the country
ed States and are thus trying to escape expedited removal and mandatory
detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
16. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, TESTING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR THE
INS: AN EVALUATION OF THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1 (2000) [hereavailable
at
inafter
VERA],
http://www.vera.org/download?file=615/finalreport.pdf (“[D]etaining every
noncitizen is neither just nor humane. Many people in removal proceedings
are fleeing persecution in their own countries . . . Detention is an ordeal they
should be spared.”).
17. THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
(2011),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_bluepri
nt.pdf.
18. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. AND CUST.
ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS
20–21 (2009), available at www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/icedetention-rpt.pdf. Dr. Schriro’s report identified a need for a “validated risk
assessment instrument specifically calibrated for the U.S. alien population.
The tool should assess initial and ongoing suitability for participation [in
ATDs].” Id. at 20.
19. Id.
20. LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE, UNLOCKING LIBERTY: A
WAY FORWARD FOR U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION POLICY 21 (2011) [hereinafter
UNLOCKING
LIBERTY]
available
at
http://lirs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/RPTUNLOCKINGLIBERTY.pdf. Asylum experts
relevant to this Note include international bodies, such as the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees and the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner’s Programme, and NGOs like Amnesty International, Human
Rights First, Vera Institute of Justice, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee
Service, and International Detention Coalition. See UNHCR, UNHCR’s Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers, (Feb. 26 1999), [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines] available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c2b3f844.html; Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The Framework, the Problem and Recommended
Practice, UNHCR, U.N. Doc. EC/49/SC/CRP.13 (Jun. 4 1999) [hereinafter ExCom on Detention]; Amnesty Int’l, Irregular Migrants and Asylum-Seekers:
Alternatives to Immigration Detention, AI Index POL 33/001/2009 (April 1,
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into compliance with international law.21 This Note argues that
unless the United States incorporates the recommendations of
asylum experts to use thorough risk-analysis in creating an individualized ATD program, it will be unlikely to reduce the unnecessary or arbitrary detention of many asylum-seekers and
will therefore be unable to meet the minimum human rights
standards required under international law.22
Part I of this Note looks at the current U.S. immigration detention system and some of the now well-established failures of
the asylum detention process preventing the country from conforming to international human rights laws and norms. Part II
explores the rationales behind detention of asylum-seekers
with an eye toward how risk-analysis and ATDs can improve
the system. Part III analyzes the current momentum for reform
of the system in the context of path dependency, the notion that
the future of the system will be dependent upon—and constrained by—decisions made now,23 and addresses why it is essential to implement the recommendations of asylum experts
now. Part IV discusses how the United States, by ignoring the
recommendations of asylum experts regarding risk-analysis
and alternatives to detention, has continuously violated international law. Part V lists the additional policy benefits to the
United States should it adopt the proposed changes of asylum
experts.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Current Status of the Detention System
Since its transition from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) to its current home as a subset of the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the Immigration
2009) [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l]; SEEKING PROTECTION, supra note 4; VERA,
supra note 16; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20; R. SAMPSON ET AL., THE
INTERNATIONAL DETENTION COALITION, THERE ARE ALTERNATIVES: A HANDBOOK
FOR PREVENTING UNNECESSARY IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2011) available at
http://idcoalition.org/cap/handbook/.
21. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6, with Preston, supra note 7.
22. E.g., ExCom on Detention, supra note 20; Alternatives to Detention,
supra note 11.
23. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
332, 332 (1985).
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and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) division has rapidly expanded the scope of its detention power and the numerical capacity
of individuals in detention.24 The United Nations has defined
detention as “the deprivation of liberty in a confined place, such
as a prison or purpose-built reception or holding centre. It is at
the extreme end of the spectrum of deprivations of liberty . . .
.”25 In the U.S. immigration context, the purview of detention
includes “the authority . . . to detain aliens who may be subject
to removal for violations of administrative immigration law.”26
Throughout fiscal year 2010, ICE detained 363,064 noncitizens.27 ICE now has bed-space to house 33,400 detainees
daily and averages 33,330 detainees per day—a notable increase from the daily average of 27,990 in 2007.28 As of 2009,
asylum-seekers constituted about 1400 of these daily detainee
totals.29 In addition to a budget of over $2 billion for its immigration Detention and Removal Office (“DRO”), Congress gave
DHS unsolicited additional funding to increase the total number of beds by 600, to 34,000 total, in fiscal year 2012.30 The
24. See SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 2, 4.
25. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 8. See also Michael Flynn, Immigration Detention and Proportionality, Global Detention Project, Working Paper
No.
4,
7–9
(Feb.
2011),
available
at
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/fileadmin/publications/GDP_detention_
and_proportionality_workingpaper.pdf (“Coming up with a one-size-fits-all
definition [of detention] is a challenging undertaking, especially when assessing a phenomenon that can radically change shape from one country to
the next.”); Holding Patterns: Can Advocacy Efforts to Reform Migration Detention Inadvertently Lead to the Growth of Detention Regimes?, OPEN
SOCIETY
INSTITUTE,
34:00–38:40
(March
28,
2012),
http://c482907.r7.cf2.rackcdn.com/migration-detention-20120328.mp3 [hereinafter Holding Patterns] (discussing different definitions of detention).
26. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4.
27. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra note 9, at 4. This statistic
includes all categories of non-citizens, not just asylum-seekers. Id.
28. Fact Sheet: Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT [ICE], http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detentionmgmt.htm (last accessed June 22, 2012). ICE notes that these numbers do
not include counts for non-citizens detained with the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program or the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Id.
29. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 11. 11,244 people were granted affirmative
asylum in fiscal year 2010, with the highest percentage of those coming from
China. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 5. This follows a general decreasing trend
in grants of asylum over the past several years. Id.
30. H.R. REP. NO. 112-91, at 52 (2011); NATIONAL IMMIGRATION FORUM, THE
MATH OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION: RUNAWAY COSTS FOR IMMIGRATION
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amount of available bed space may affect the amount of time
an individual is detained.31 The average time of detention for
asylum-seekers is controversial; some experts say it ranges
from 47 to 109 days, while others indicate that it might be
much longer.32
Within the U.S. system, detention often consists of placement
in county jails or commercialized detention centers.33 While
this Note does not explore human rights violations or improvements extant within the detention system beyond its arbitrary or unnecessary overuse, it is worthy of mention that
extensive scholarship explores issues involving the general
criminalization of the civil immigration system;34 the effects of

DETENTION DO NOT ADD UP TO SENSIBLE POLICIES 2 (2012), available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/MathofImmigrationDetent
ion.pdf.
31. Michelle Brané & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars:
Advancing the Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through
Human Rights Frameworks, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 157 (2008).
32. Renewing America’s Commitment to the Refugee Convention: The Refugee Protection Act of 2010: Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2010) (statement for the record from Physicians for Human Rights), available
at
http://rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/PHR%20Testimony,%205-19-10.pdf;
UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 12. The U.S. Supreme Court case
Zadvydas v. Davis, which declared detentions of more than six months to be
unreasonable and at odds with the U.S. Constitution, does not protect asylum-seekers because it only addressed the detention of those who were detained while awaiting deportation, as opposed to awaiting asylum proceedings. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
33. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, Report on Immigration in the United States: Detention and Due
Process, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc.78/10, 85–87 (2010) [hereinafter IACHR]. As of
2009, approximately 50% of all detainees were held in county jails that also
contained prisoners. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 10.
With only a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses to detain aliens were built, and operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial
and sentenced felons. ICE relies primarily on correctional incarceration standards designed for pre-trial felons and on correctional principles of care, custody, and control. These standards impose more restrictions and carry more costs than are necessary to effectively
manage the majority of the detained population.
Id. at 2–3.
34. See generally Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010). Criminal and immigrant populations in
detention are treated essentially the same. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4.
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family and child detention;35 and the lack of adequate medical
care,36 access to legal representation,37 and workable civil
standards for detention.38
B. The Process for Detaining Asylum-Seekers in the United
States
Currently, non-citizens entering the United States without
legally having gone through the proper immigration process in
advance are automatically placed in expedited removal proceedings unless they express their desire to apply for asylum to
an immigration officer.39 Once they do so, an immigration officer will detain the asylum-seeker pending the filing of their
asylum application and an interview with an asylum officer.40
From this point forward, the asylum-seeker is subject to mandatory detention, unless and until they can establish a basis for
discretionary parole or they are deported.41
After filing for asylum, the detainee proceeds to what is referred to as a “credible fear hearing” or “credible fear inter-

35. Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 58-62.
36. See generally Riddhi Mukhopadhyay, Death in Detention: Medical and
Mental Health Consequences of Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the
United States, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 693 (2009).
37. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING THE U.S.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM–A TWO-YEAR REVIEW, 30 (2011) [hereinafter
JAILS AND JUMPSUITS], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf.
38. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 4 (“ICE adopted standards that are based
upon corrections law and promulgated by correctional organizations to guide
the operation of jails and prisons.”).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)(2012). Some exceptions do exist to bar an
arriving alien from applying for asylum in the United States. Notably, he or
she cannot have come from a safe third country where he or she could have
sought asylum; additionally, subject to extenuating circumstances, he or she
cannot have waited more than a year to apply for asylum after arriving in the
United States or have had a previous unsuccessful asylum application. 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). While both are members of ICE, asylum
officers are distinct from immigration officers in that they have “professional
training in country conditions, asylum law, and interview techniques comparable to that provided to full-time adjudicators of [asylum] applications” and
that more experienced asylum officers supervise them. 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(E).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra
note 9, at 2. Parole will be discussed in more depth below.
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view,”42 which may take place up to forty-five days after the
filing of an application for asylum.43 At the hearing, one seeking asylum must establish to the satisfaction of an asylum officer that he or she has a “credible fear of persecution” in his or
her home country.44 This fear is defined as “a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements
made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and other such
facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish
eligibility for asylum” under existing U.S. law.45 At a credible
fear hearing, an ICE officer has the sole ability to determine if
the asylum-seeker has a credible fear that will likely support a
future favorable asylum ruling by an immigration judge.46 This
is the first, but not only, opportunity for individual discretion
or arbitrariness to seep into the asylum process.47 If the determination of the asylum officer is unfavorable, the asylumseeker will be slated for expedited removal “without further
hearing or review.”48 If favorable, the asylum officer will refer
the asylum-seeker for asylum adjudication in front of an immigration judge.49 By statute, the entire proceeding, excluding
appeal, should be concluded within 180 days, although the
42. E.g., Brané & Lunholm, supra note 31, at 150.
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(ii)(2012).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). Authority for asylum itself is based on 8
U.S.C. § 1158. The United States limits the available categories of persecution for which one can claim asylum to “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2012).
46. Gwynne Skinner, International Law Weekend 2009-I: Bringing International Law to Bear on the Detention of Refugees in the United States, 16
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RES. 270, 275 n.18 (2008). Other than a
lack of credible fear, factors that might lead to rejection of a claim at this
point may include “committing certain crimes, posing a national security
threat, engaging in the persecution of others, or firmly resettling in another
country before coming to the United States.” MARTIN, supra note 15, at 4.
47. ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that discretion leads
to arbitrariness). For a criticism of the United States’ ability to determine
credibility as being arbitrary in relation to refugee determinations, see Andrew F. Moore, Unsafe in America: A Review of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement, 47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 201, 237–238 (2007).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). If the asylum-seeker makes a “prompt”
request, he or she may have the decision reviewed by an immigration judge,
which by statute must happen no later than seven days after the negative
credible fear determination. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).
49. Skinner, supra note 46, at 275.
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statute provides for the extension of this timeframe for “exceptional circumstances.”50
As noted, prior to being granted asylum by an immigration
judge, arriving asylum-seekers are subject to mandatory detention unless they can establish their basis for discretionary parole.51 This presumption in favor of detention is codified in 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which authorizes the Attorney General,
in his discretion[, to] parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a caseby-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United
States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as
an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been
served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the
custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of
any other applicant for admission to the United States.52

Thus, asylum-seekers will only be paroled if an individualized
case analysis reveals there is an “urgent humanitarian reason”
or “significant public benefit” for so doing. 53 This basis for parole has also been defined as applying to those classes of aliens
“whose continued detention is not in the public interest as determined by [ICE officials].”54 In a policy shift effective early
2010, ICE began to interpret parole in the “public interest” under this section to require “that the alien’s identity is sufficiently established, the alien poses neither a flight risk nor a danger
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(iii) (2012); Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Parole of Arriving
Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture, at 2 (Dec. 8,
2009)
[hereinafter
Credible
Fear
Parole],
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/pdf/11002.1-hdparole_of_arriving_aliens_found_credible_fear.pdf.
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)(2012).
53. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(5) (2012). Other classes enumerated under this section are more readily eligible for parole because they do not include a discretionary determination by an ICE official; these include individuals with serious medical conditions, pregnant women, juveniles, and those who are serving as witnesses in court proceedings. Id.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). See also 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); Credible Fear
Parole, supra note 51, at 2, 6–8.
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to the community, and no additional factors weigh against the
release of the alien.”55
While this development is a positive shift because it streamlined and increased the transparency of parole decisions, the
proof requirements remain an especially weighty burden for
asylum-seekers.56 Despite apparent sympathy to the circumstances of asylum-seekers, the policy emphasizes the discretionary nature of parole and requires the asylum-seeker to bear
the burden of demonstrating this information to the satisfaction of an ICE officer.57 The policy standards themselves recognize the inherent difficulties for asylum-seekers to provide adequate documentation or produce credible witnesses to corroborate their claims on asylum matters.58 These difficulties may
include a lack of travel documents, often associated with an
asylum-seeker’s unwillingness or inability to contact their for-

55. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6. In 2011, Morton issued an
additional directive, entitled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent
with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (“Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion”), which essentially incorporates the earlier memo and reiterates the
discretion of ICE officers to grant parole to an asylum-seeker under specific
circumstances. See Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6. ICE is
quick to add that the established policy creates no private cause of action.
Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 10.
56. IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47. The international community has
reviewed and commented on the general shift in ICE detention policy under
the Obama Administration. See, e.g., id. On the positive side, asylum-seekers
no longer have to file for parole; a parole meeting is automatic within seven
days of an asylum officer determining that the asylum-seeker has a credible
fear of persecution. Id. There are provisions to improve the transparency of
the process both through increased documentation and through informing
asylum-seekers about the process and their rights within it. Id. However,
there are criticisms in the international community that these changes do not
adequately address the problems for detainees, as they still bear a potentially
“insurmountable” burden of proof on the identity, flight risk, and security
issues. Id. Furthermore, because of the discretionary nature of the process,
there is great potential for arbitrary denials of parole, and thus arbitrary
detention; this arbitrariness is especially obvious when considering regional
disparities in parole denials. Id. Additionally, negative parole determinations
remain reviewable only at the discretion of an ICE officer, which enforces the
officer’s role as both “judge and jailer.” IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47. See
also Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51. For the policy itself, see Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6.
57. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6–8.
58. Id.
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mer government, or a lack of ties to any community within the
United States as a result of their recent urgent arrival.59 Asylum-seekers are additionally prejudiced because, by virtue of
their situation, any attempt to meet this proof requirement to
gain parole must be done while in detention.60 Moreover, the
same set of challenges, particularly the notion that “detention
will often deprive the asylum-seeker of an opportunity to present his or her [case] or to have the assistance of counsel,”61
limit the asylum-seeker’s ability to successfully obtain parole.62
Furthermore, because the policy standards are non-binding,
they can be changed at any time and thus do not provide any
lasting guarantees even for the opportunity of parole.63 As a
result, the system remains weighted in favor of continued detention.64
C. How the U.S. Detention System Violates International Human Rights Laws and Norms
Numerous legal scholars and advocacy groups have argued
that the U.S. detention policy—featuring a presumption in fa-

59. Id.
60. Mark L. Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to
Appointed Counsel for Manditorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal
Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing how detention leads to “cascading deprivations” of rights of those detained—for example, the difficulties in obtaining counsel from detention may lead to higher
rates of unsuccessful cases and time wasted arguing over appointed counsel
for detainees); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Non-Penalization, Detention, and Protection, in
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 185, 223 (Erika Feller et al.
eds., 2003) (“Detention will often deprive the asylum-seeker of an opportunity
to present his or her case.”); SAMPSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 50 (“social isolation is a significant issue for most detainees.”). The parole determination
“typically occurs within three weeks of apprehension.” UNLOCKING LIBERTY,
supra note 20, at 20.
61. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 223. See also, Noferi, supra note 60, at
25–26 (“The difficulty of challenging an immigration detention and case while
detained is compounded by the inability of most detainees to secure counsel—
or, indeed, any adequate source of legal assistance.”).
62. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 223; Noferi, supra note 60, at 25–
26.
63. IACHR, supra note 33, at 45–47; Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51.
64. See Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6–8. See also IACHR, supra
note 33, at 45–47; Kalhan, supra note 34, at 51.
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vor of detention—violates international obligations.65 Various
treaties and conventions articulate an aversion to immigration
detention in the vast majority of circumstances, finding it to be
violative of human rights principles.66 This includes the more
specific rules regarding asylum-seekers who declare their desire to seek asylum once they are within the country to which
they fled.67 “In most cases, only if an individual’s claim to refugee status is examined before he or she is affected by an exercise of State jurisdiction . . . can the State be sure that its international obligations are met.”68 This pre-approval, however,
may prove challenging for asylum-seekers to attain given that
the persecution many of them are fleeing might not provide the
time or opportunity to plan ahead and apply for protection in
another country before leaving their home country.69
The United States is not a party to all of such conventions or
treaties,70 although it is arguably bound under customary international laws71 or norms to abide by them anyway.72 Codifi-

65. E.g., SEEKING PROTECTION, supra note 4; VERA, supra note 16, at 31–
32; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, 5–6; Brané & Lundholm, supra note
31.
66. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 9 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (against
arbitrary detention of all people); Refugee Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2); 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 9, 12 [hereinafter
ICCPR] (against arbitrary and unnecessary detention).
67. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 66; Refugee Convention, supra note 15;
Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15; ICCPR, supra note 66, arts. 9,
12.
68. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 187 (emphasis in original). Here “State
jurisdiction” indicates the country to which the asylum-seeker fled. See id.
69. See, e.g., Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6 (recognizing that
arriving aliens might not have travel documents because of flight).
70. For example, the United States “remains the only state, other than
Somalia, which has not ratified the [Convention on the Rights of the Child],”
a convention essential for guaranteeing rights of children and families in asylum and other contexts. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 153.
71. Customary international law is “international law that derives from
the practice of states and is accepted by them as legally binding. This is one
of the principal sources or building blocks of the international legal system.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 892 (9th ed. 2009).
72. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111(1) (1987) (“International law and international agreements of the United States are law of
the United States and supreme over the law of the several States.”). See also
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cation of customary international law declares that a country
“violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages or condones . . . prolonged arbitrary detention.”73 Admittedly, some international laws or norms have
exigency exceptions that allow states to detain aliens in cases
of “necessity.”74 However, as most of those detained do not present any risks to the State from which they are seeking aid,
these exigency exceptions do not justify the categorical detention of all asylum-seekers.75
There are multiple international treaties that protect the
rights of people seeking asylum, and many have prohibitions
against “arbitrary” detention, “unnecessary” detention, or
both.76 Beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“UDHR”), the international community has recognized
“the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.”77 Furthermore, the UDHR established that “no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.”78
While establishing these rights that would come to form the
basis of international human rights law, the drafters of the
UDHR did not define many of the terms they used, including
“arbitrary.”79
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(“1951 Convention”) expanded upon the UDHR by creating a
multilateral treaty wherein “the contracting states shall not
apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of
our law.”).
73. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 702(e) (1987).
74. See, e.g., Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2); Goodwin-Gill,
supra note 60, at 232.
75. See Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 2 (“[L]ess than ten percent of asylum applicants . . . disappear when they are released to proper supervision
and facilities.”).
76. UDHR, supra note 66, art. 9 (against arbitrary detention); Refugee
Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15;
ICCPR, supra note 66, at arts. 9, 12 (against arbitrary and unnecessary detention). The two terms are interrelated, as detaining unnecessarily can constitute arbitrariness. See, e.g. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 157.
77. UDHR, supra note 66, art. 14(1)(III).
78. Id. art. 9 (emphasis added).
79. See UDHR, supra note 66, art. 14(1)(III) (not defining terms used); The
Foundation
of
International
Human
Rights
Law,
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml (last accessed June 22,
2012) (UDHR as basis for field of international human rights law).
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than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only
be applied until their status in the country is regularized or
they obtain admission into another country.”80 While detention
for identity verification, public safety, and national security
have been given as examples of detention that could potentially
be considered “necessary,” and therefore permissible under the
1951 Convention, some scholars have interpreted detention
subsequent to these conditions to be only for extraordinary circumstances.81 While the United States did not sign the 1951
Convention, it did ratify the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Convention that incorporated and modernized the Convention, thereby
binding the United States to those international obligations.82
In addition to the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol restrictions
against unnecessary detention, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) prohibits detention from being “arbitrary.”83 Under Article 9 of the ICCPR, arbitrary detention, though not precisely defined, is expressly
prohibited.84 Article 9 further holds speedy access to a court
proceeding to be essential for anyone “deprived of his liberty by
. . . detention.”85
Because much of the language in these treaties is vague or
undefined, the international community seeks guidance from
both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”) and the Executive Committee of the UNHCR (“Ex-

80. Refugee Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(2) (emphasis added).
81. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 232.
82. Refugee Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention,
supra note 15. The United States signed the 1967 Protocol without any reservations, understandings, or declarations (“RUDs”) relevant to this analysis.
Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15.
83. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(1). The United States ratified the ICCPR
in 1992, attaching RUDs that limit some provisions, but none specifically
relevant to this analysis. Id. The United States declared the Convention to be
non-self-executing, or incapable of taking effect without implementing legislation. Id; Kessler, supra note 3, at 577; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (9th
ed. 2009) (defining self-executing).
84. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(1); Kessler, supra note 3, at 580 (“In the
context of Article 9(1), [arbitrary] encompasses not just unlawful detentions,
but also all those that are unjust, unpredictable, unreasonable, capricious,
and disproportional.”).
85. ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 9(4).
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Com”) in interpreting its obligations to refugees.86 The ExCom
has stated that
[W]ide discretionary powers [to detain] . . . are far too frequently applied in an arbitrary manner. For instance, a large
number of asylum-seekers are detained on the formal basis
that it is likely that they will abscond . . . international
standards dictate that there must be some substantive basis
for such a conclusion in the individual case.87

The specious justification of needing to prove an asylumseeker’s identity is yet another example of arbitrariness in the
detention process.88 Proving identity “should not routinely be
judged necessary” in light of the circumstances which lead asylum-seekers to flee persecution in the first place.89 The ExCom
guidelines emphasize that implementing individualized,
“prompt, mandatory and periodic review of all detention orders
before an independent and impartial body” of the destinationstate’s need to detain is fundamental to avoiding arbitrary detention.90 Furthermore, the UNHCR has continually advocated
for a presumption against detention.91
Scholars have additionally argued that arbitrary detention
exists where there is “inappropriateness, injustice, and lack of
predictability” in the detention process.92 “Arbitrary detention
occurs when refugee applicants are detained on the basis of
broad criteria that do not allow for individualized determina86. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 n.22 (1987). The
United States Supreme Court has held that at least one set of guidelines established by the UNHCR is helpful in interpreting 1967 Protocol obligations.
Id. In discussing the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status, written by the UNHCR, the Court said, “the Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress
sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful in giving content to
the obligations that the Protocol establishes.” Id. The Court noted that the
guidance, while helpful, was non-binding. Id. See also, Skinner, supra note
46, at 278–79.
87. ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 3–4.
91. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 20, at 3; UNHCR, Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, U.N. Doc. 44 (XXXVII) – 1986 (Oct. 13, 1986); ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 1.
92. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 156–57 (quoting GUY GOODWINGILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (2d ed. 1996)).
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tions of the need for detention, when there is no administrative
or judicial review, or when detention occurs for disproportionate or extended periods.”93
U.S. practices are arbitrary because detention is applied as a
“blanket policy;” chances for parole—varying “anywhere from
0.5% to 98%”—are inconsistent;94 judicial review, in practice, is
either unavailable or limited by judges citing a lack of jurisdiction; and because compliance rates are quite high, further supporting “the argument that the detention of asylum seekers is
arbitrary because it is unnecessary.”95 Moreover, there is evidence to suggest arbitrariness in parole decisions, as some
watchdog groups have found that the choice to parole an asylum-seeker can sometimes be made based on available bed
space in detention centers rather than the merits of an individual’s claim for release.96 As put forth in the Restatement Third,
“[A] single, brief, arbitrary detention by an official of a state
party to one of the principal international agreements might
violate that agreement; arbitrary detention violates customary
law if it is prolonged and practiced as state policy.”97 This
weighs against the United States’ categorical detention of all
asylum-seekers because, without sufficient individualized assessment, there is no way to ensure detention is necessary.98
Additionally, because the U.S. policy leaves determinations of
credible fear and parole to the discretion of individual ICE officers, any localized breach or non-compliance can result in international law violations.99
The international community has noticed the United States’
violations of international law.100 Following his May 2007 visit,
the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants expressed his “serious concern” with the status of the U.S. deten93. Moore, supra note 47, at 267.
94. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 157 (“[Parole policy] seems to
depend more upon the personality of the district director and the available
bed space than it does upon a reasoned policy of release criteria.”).
95. Id.
96. Moore, supra note 47, at 263, 269.
97. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 702 cmt. h (1987).
98. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 60, at 219.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants, Mission to
the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/12/Add.2 (Mar. 5, 2008) (by
Jorge Bustamante) [hereinafter Mission to the United States]; IACHR, supra
note 33, at 144.
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tion system.101 The Special Rapporteur “[came] to the conclusion that the United States ha[d] failed to adhere to its international obligations to make the human rights of the 37.5 million migrants living in the country . . . a national priority, using
a comprehensive and coordinated national policy based on clear
international obligations.”102 His report went on to discuss the
various violations of international law within the United
States103 and made recommendations for improvement that included the complete elimination of mandatory detention.104
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
produced in 2011 a comprehensive report on the U.S. immigration and detention system.105 Along with urging the United
States to “comply fully with the international human rights obligations under the American Declaration [of the Rights and
Duties of Man],”106 the Commission advocated for the country’s
discontinuation of mandatory detention practices.107
II. DISASSOCIATING FROM PRESUMPTIONS THAT FAVOR
DETENTION
In order to become compliant with international law, the U.S.
detention practices for refugees and asylum-seekers need to
align more closely with the protection-based mandates of the
aforementioned provisions that proscribe detention from being
either arbitrary or unnecessary.108 To do this, the United States
needs to utilize risk-analysis and ATDs to release or parole detainees held without legitimate justification.109 However, no
alternative program can be successful until the U.S. immigration system shifts its application of immigration statutes from
101. Mission to the United States, supra note 100, at 2.
102. Id. at 3.
103. See generally id.
104. Id. at 24.
105. IACHR, supra note 33.
106. Id. at 155. In its reply to the draft version of the report, the United
States was quick to point out that the American Declaration is “a nonbinding
instrument that does not itself create legal rights or impose legal obligations
on signatory states.” Id. at 7. The IACHR countered that the Declaration does
create obligations for member and non-member states alike under the charter
of the Organization of American States, the American regional counterpart to
the United Nations, of which the United States is a member. Id. at 10.
107. Id. at 147.
108. See Part I.B., supra.
109. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, supra note 20, at 16.
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the categorical mandatory detention of asylum-seekers to a
more flexible system where detention is used only as a last resort.110 Many asylum experts have advocated for this and have
created programs based on the “presumption against detention” model.111 To understand how, by following suit, the United States could avoid arbitrary or unnecessary detention, it is
first helpful to recognize the rationales it puts forth for using a
mandatory detention policy in the first place.112 Section A
enunciates what risks the United States assumes when, rather
than detain, it releases asylum-seekers into an ATD program
and, by extension, the community. Sections B and C seek to
understand the potential benefits of effectively implemented
risk analysis and ATD programs as compared to those currently in operation within the U.S. system.
A. Detention Rationales
Countries often cite the inherent risks associated with admitting aliens as a rationale for detaining them.113 As discussed in
Part I.B, the current U.S. detention policy centers on these
risks by presuming detention for aliens unless they are able to
establish: 1) their identity, 2) that they are not a flight risk
and, 3) that they are not a danger to society; or they must establish they have an additional extenuating circumstance that
justifies their release.114 By exploring the scope of these inherent risks, the United States can better address any actual risks
and ultimately eliminate the use of detention that is excessive
in matching the scope of that risk.115
The United States justifies detention—at least until there is
satisfactory proof of the asylum-seeker’s identity—by citing the
need to ensure that the alien will comply with specific proceedings, including meeting attendance, hearings, and, potentially,

110. See, e.g., JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 37, at 42.
111. See, e.g., SAMPSON ET AL., supra note 20.
112. See Brané & Lundholm, supra note 31, at 149–52 (exploring detention
rationales).
113. See id.
114. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 2–3, 6–8. Extenuating circumstances include serious medical conditions, pregnancy, juvenile status, and
aliens slated to serve as witnesses. 8 C.F.R § 212.5(b); Credible Fear Parole,
supra note 51, at 2.
115. See Brané, supra note 31, at 149–52.
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removal.116 The United States has declared, “asylum-related
fraud is of genuine concern”117 and also wants to be certain before paroling an asylum-seeker that the person is not threatening to the community or the nation as a whole.118 Further, the
current policy indicates that detention will continue if there are
“serious adverse foreign policy consequences that may result if
the alien is released or [if there are] overriding law enforcement interests.”119 Moreover, the U.S. immigration system is
bogged down120 and the caseload in immigration courts is high,
increasing the time that asylum-seekers in detention must wait
for their case to be heard.121
Yet if the U.S. method of detention is meant to serve as a deterrence to emigration, the strategy itself would violate international laws.122 Regardless of a host country’s detention policies, asylum-seekers will always impose some level of risk to
that country.123 Thus, to argue that U.S. asylum detention is an

116. Credible Fear Parole, supra note 51, at 6 (“likelihood of appearing
when required”) (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 7.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Michael Matza, Immigration Cases Clogging Federal Courts,
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 18, 2011, at A2 (“Despite the nationwide hiring of more
than 40 additional [immigration court] judges in the past year, the number of
deportation cases, asylum claims, and green-card fraud prosecutions … is at
an all time high: 275,000 and climbing.”); Dan Moffett, Conveyor Belt to Deportation: Asylum Cases don’t get Attention they Deserve, PALM BEACH POST,
Feb. 16, 2010, at A14 (“the system is choked by an exploding caseload and an
exponential increase in outside pressures…the backlog has gotten progressively worse in the last decade.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson & Russell R. Walker, Enhancing Quality
and Timeliness in Immigration Removal Adjudication, Report for the Administrative Conference for the United States, June 7, 2012, 40–42, available at
http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/EnhancingQuality-and-Timeliness-in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June72012.pdf (suggesting that defensive asylum cases should be heard by asylum
officers like affirmative cases are, rather than immigration judges, in order to
speed the process).
122. Refugee Convention, supra note 15, at art. 31(2); Protocol to Refugee
Convention, supra note 15 (incorporating the articles of the Refugee Convention); See Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 228 (noting the fear that
deterrence is the true rationale behind U.S. detention and parole policies).
123. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 1. “Any reduction in global asylum
numbers have been associated with non-entrée policies, including contain-
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effective deterrence factor is to ignore the reason that people
are seeking asylum in the first place: they consider the situation they are fleeing to be worse.124 Risk-analysis tools and
ATDs can work together to ameliorate the concerns that justify
detention, and reduce the burden on the U.S. immigration system, by allowing for the parole of more asylum-seekers.125
B. The Importance of Risk-Analysis
To address these limited, but admittedly legitimate, fears
and still comply with international obligations, the United
States needs to assess the level of risk that asylum-seekers
pose on an individual level, regarding both danger to society
and risk of flight.126 Risk-analysis tools fill the gap between
categorical detention and ATDs by ensuring that any method
used for a person is necessary and not arbitrary, thus complying with international treaties.127 Detention can be legitimate
under international law only when an individualized assessment establishes that there is no lesser method that the government can take to mitigate the dangers posed by that particular non-citizen.128 This is because
international human rights law requires that detention decisions be made on a case-by-case basis after an individualized
assessment of the functional and legitimate need of detaining
a particular individual, the understanding that anyone deprived of liberty is entitled to judicial review of this decision,

ment in regions of origin and interception/interdiction measures, or can be
attributed to large-scale repatriation programmes.” Id. at 1 n.4.
124. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 2 (“[T]hreats to life or freedom in
countries of origin are likely to be a greater push factor than any disincentive
created by detention policies in countries of destination.”). “The principal aim
of asylum seekers and refugees is to reach a place of safety . . . those who are
aware of the prospect of detention before arrival believe it is an unavoidable
part of the journey, that they will still be treated humanely despite being
detained.” SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 11.
125. SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22.
126. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 17, 20. While this Note focuses on riskanalysis as the capacity to reduce threats posed to the community, the assessments can also include screening for special vulnerabilities present in the
individual that require attention. SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22.
127. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 15.
128. See, e.g., ExCom on Detention, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that arbitrariness results unless there is an individualized determination that a person is
likely to abscond).
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and that any restriction of liberty should be the least restrictive means necessary.129

An appropriate risk assessment tool would allow the United
States to screen for the identified threats posed by non-citizens
entering the country—lack of identity, risk of flight, and risk of
danger—in order to make decisions about the level of supervision and support necessary to ensure compliance with the system.130 Such a tool could allow the United States to increase
legitimacy within the system through increased compliance
while reducing detention costs in favor of less-costly ATDs.131
One criticism of the efficacy of any risk-assessment procedure
is that there is a general absence of data at either the national
or the international level regarding the success or failure of
asylum-seekers to comply with proceedings or mandates.132
“The scarcity of governmental statistics with regard to those
who abscond [or fail to comply with a removal order] severely
weakens the empirical evaluation of one form of conditional release in comparison to another.”133 One way to ensure that asylum-seekers are paroled or, if detained, that detention is in the
least restrictive manner, is to increase predictability of asylumseekers absconding by improving data collection via risk assessments.134
An interesting parallel can be drawn to recent risk and data
collection paradigms the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol
(“CBP”) has utilized, in the context of national security, regarding the flow of people and goods through U.S. borders.135 In response to increasing terror threats against the United States,
CBP has utilized improved data analysis to distinguish be129. Id.
130. See SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22 (“[A]ssessment enables authorities
to make an informed decision about the most appropriate way to manage and
support the individual as they seek to resolve their migration status and to
make case-by-case decisions about the need to detain or not.”).
131. See Unlocking Liberty, supra note 20, at 41–42 (identifying the shortcomings of “standard risk assessment” as opposed to individualized risk assessment).
132. See Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 24–25.
133. Id. at 25.
134. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 18–19.
135. See generally CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL, CBP Launches Centers to
Facilitate Processing of Imports, October 20, 2011, available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national/2011_news_arc
hive/10202011_2.xml.
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tween safe and unsafe traffic, goods, and passengers.136 Speeding up the screening process for safe traffic actually increased
CBP’s ability to focus resources on who or what was a true
threat.137 Essential to speeding up safe traffic is the sharing of
information not only within an organization but also between
an organization and “safe” civilians, across multiple agencies,
and among nations.138 CBP’s efforts provide a model for the
way that ICE can speed up the parole of safe detainees in order
to better focus on those that are unsafe.139 Based on CBP’s
model, the United States might be able to speed asylumseekers into parole or ATDs in a number of ways, such as having ICE offices become more efficient at reporting factors contributing to or detracting from compliance; requiring ICE and
NGOs to compile data on asylum-seekers’ compliance; or by
sharing statistics with Canada and Mexico relating to risks
posed by asylum-seekers and ultimate compliance.140 The expedited process could have similar benefits as those seen by
CBP—the ability to focus finances and personnel on true
136. Alan D. Bersin, Lecture, Lines and Flows: The Beginning and End of
Borders 12, Ira M. Belfer Lecture, Brooklyn Law School (Oct. 6, 2011).
137. Bersin, supra note 136. See also, UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at
41 (“Using individualized custody determinations could improve efficiency by
maintaining the detention levels necessary and diverting those resources to
more appropriate means of ensuring that immigrants report for immigration
proceedings.”) (emphasis added).
138. Bersin, supra note 136, at 9–11.
139. Bersin, supra note 136. See generally U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION [CBP], OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL, NATIONAL BORDER PATROL
STRATEGY
(2004),
available
at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_pa
trol_ohs/national_bp_strategy.ctt/national_bp_strategy.pdf. For example, the
Northern Border Project has the goal of developing technology along the
U.S./Canada border to better address the challenges of protecting that border. It includes testing an “Apex-Secure Transit Corridor” wherein members
of the transit industry use government-approved technology when crossing
the border to streamline the security screening process. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY [DHS], CBP, NORTHERN BORDER DIVISION FACT SHEET,
available
at
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/border/secure_bor
der/northern_border_fs.ctt/northern_border_fs.pdf (Last accessed Sept. 17,
2012).
140. Compare id. See also, Holding Patterns, supra note 25, at 28:30–30:18
(discussing frustration at how detention issues become localized despite the
fact that many countries face them, but how governments are beginning to
work together).
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threats—while also avoiding unnecessary or arbitrary detention by releasing individuals who qualify into ATDs.141 To ensure that the process does not become discriminatory or too bureaucratic, expert input, trained staff, specific guidelines, and
formal review should be a part of any new data analysis process.142
While overriding long-standing aversions to sharing between
countries could be a challenge at any level of cooperation, the
benefits of increased data sharing and analysis in this digitized, information-driven society outweigh the drawbacks.143
Data regarding compliance on a national or international level
could influence detention planning on the whole and decisions
made in individual cases in the same way data from pilot programs have already shaped decisions on a smaller scale.144 Ultimately, by “designing effective alternatives to detention and
knowing when they can and should be relied upon to work,”
risk analysis, supplemented by data collection, can help to reduce unnecessary and arbitrary detention.145
C. Why Alternatives to Detention are Important
In the spectrum between full detention and unrestrained liberty, ATDs occupy any method that is not at either extreme.146
These methods include, from the most to the least restrictive:
in-home detention and electronic monitoring; supervision or
reporting; residency restrictions; release to community supervision; release on bail, bond, or surety; and documentation.147 It
is important to note, however, that just because a given method
has been classified as an ATD does not mean it necessarily

141. See Bersin, supra note 138. See also, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note
35, at 29 (“if the data used during risk assessment is linked appropriately to
a centralized database . . . the tool may provide much-needed information
about release processes and classification decisions at all facilities in the detention system, improving the potential for oversight and accountability.”).
142. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 18–21; Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 81.
143. Bersin, supra note 138, at 9–11. Bersin noted that U.S. Customs and
Border Patrol operates the “U.S. government’s largest collection, storage and
dissemination functions with respect to unclassified data.” Id. at 10.
144. See VERA, supra note 16, at iii; Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11,
at 24–25.
145. Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 25.
146. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 8–9.
147. Id. at 53.
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complies with international law.148 The intensity of a given
ATD method varies, but in order to avoid violating international legal mandates it should comport with the level of risk established via risk-analysis on a case-by-case basis.149 Because of
this, asylum-seekers already eligible for parole without restrictions should not be placed in ATD programs that are more
restrictive than parole as doing so would result in more restrictions on liberty than necessary.150 ATDs should be utilized
for those asylum-seekers who do not require more restrictive
deprivations of liberty, such as detention, and not as a substitute for lesser restrictions like release on parole.151
Many ATD methods, if implemented properly, could allow the
United States to harmonize the delicate balance between the
systemic risks that lead to over-detention and the international
human rights laws that only authorize detention as a last resort.152 This is because many ATDs occupy a middle ground,
addressing the risks that detention is intended to prevent
while allowing the asylum-seeker to be free from unnecessary
or arbitrary detention.153 Some programs utilize residency restrictions in a variety of ways, including “open centers, semiopen centers, [or] directed residence” that often allow the asylum-seeker to be released into the community with varying levels of supervision.154 The most successful ATD programs utilize
a combination of ATD methods designed to meet the needs and
risks of individual asylum-seekers.155
Yet even some ATD programs can violate international law;
methods such as home detention and electronic tagging are
“very intensive” methods in relation to the restrictions they
place on liberty and can rise to the level of detention despite
technical release.156 It is possible that even allowing for release
148. Id. at 9.
149. Compare SAMPSON, supra note 20, at 22 with Part I.C., supra.
150. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 39.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., SAMPSON, supra note 20 (presenting the “Community Assessment and Placement model,” which blends risk analysis and ATDs to meet
humanitarian standards).
153. Sampson, supra note 20, at 53.
154. Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 30–35.
155. See, e.g., Sampson, supra note 20, at 22.
156. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 38–39; Holding Patterns, supra
note 25, at 36:36–38:40 (stating that these intensive methods should be a last
resort).
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on bail, bond, or surety—often considered less restrictive and
typically involving no more restrictions on liberty than a financial or vouch-person guarantee—may violate international law
where asylum-seekers remain unnecessarily detained simply
because they have little access to funds or community sponsors,
and not because they pose a threat.157 As such, implementing
these methods alone may not bring the United States into compliance with international law.158
One example of a successful NGO pilot ATD program is the
community supervision experiment titled “Appearance Assistance Program” (“AAP”), developed and tested in the late 1990s
by the Vera Institute of Justice at the request of then-extant
INS.159 The program provided for asylum-seekers classified in
its “intensive” track160 to be released from detention to the supervision of AAP staff.161 The supervision included monthly
monitoring and reporting requirements—both in person and
via phone—and repeated flight-risk evaluations.162 AAP also
offered support to asylum-seekers by giving information about
obligations, hearing dates, the legal process, and the available
services within the community.163 By utilizing strategic intake
interviews and supervision that had the potential to alert AAP
staff of participant non-compliance or the threat thereof, AAP
staff were able to recommend decreased, constant, or increased
supervision, or even redetention if necessary.164 Not only did
asylum-seeker participants have high appearance rates at
court dates165—93%—thereby addressing the risks used to jus-

157. See, Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 54–55; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 38–39.
158. See, UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 38. See also, Part I.C., supra.
159. VERA, supra note 16. The program divided non-citizens in the program
into three groups. Id. at 1. Only the findings relating to the asylum-seeker
group will be discussed in this Note.
160. The program also operated a low-intensity “regular” track, not the subject of this inquiry, wherein participants voluntarily enrolled in the program
after being released on parole by INS. VERA, supra note 16, at 2.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 13–17.
165. The high appearance rates are as compared with appearance rates of
78% for asylum-seekers that were members of the control group, on parole
but not participating in AAP. Id. at 27.
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tify categorical detention,166 but the program also reduced unnecessary detention by presuming release and only redetaining
those who violated the conditions of release or who truly were a
flight risk.167
III. IMMIGRATION, DETENTION, AND PATH DEPENDENCY
Despite the expansive reach of ICE and DHS detention powers, the United States is on the edge of immigration reforms
that have the potential to change the face of the immigration
system and could bring the country within the standards mandated by international laws.168 The Obama Administration began to discuss an overhaul of the immigration detention system
in response to an unfavorable report by a DHS consultant.169
Since then, a series of developments has energized the reform
advocates seeking to alter the status quo of immigration and
detention in the United States.170 Attorney General Eric Holder
made a 2011 announcement (“PD Memo”) that granted discretion to ICE officers to decline prosecution or detention in a
number of situations, including those pertaining to asylumseekers.171 Additionally, in late 2011, DHS began a review of
300,000 immigration cases with the aim of implementing the
PD Memo and allowing the department to focus its limited resources on “deporting foreigners who committed serious crimes
or pose national security risks.”172 Furthermore, ICE has recently developed and begun testing a risk assessment tool to be
used in determining parole-eligibility for detainees, slated for

166. See Part II.A., supra.
167. VERA, supra note 16, at 16–17.
168. See generally, THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 17; Detention Reform Accomplishments, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT [ICE],
http://www.ice.gov/detention-reform/detention-reform.htm
(last
accessed
June 24, 2012) [hereinafter Detention Reform Accomplishments].
169. SCHRIRO, supra note 18; Detention Reform Accomplishments, supra
note 170.
170. See Robert Pear, Fewer Youths to Be Deported in New Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at A1; Preston, supra note 7; U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ICE Parole Guideline is an Important First Step to Fix
Flawed Treatment of Asylum Seekers in the United States, (Dec. 23, 2009),
available at http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/2891.html.
171. Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6.
172. Julia Preston, U.S. to Review Cases Seeking Deportations, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2011, at A1; Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6.
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nationwide implementation in 2012.173 The United States has
also consolidated multiple former ATD programs into one – the
Intensive Supervision Appearance Program II (“ISAP II”) – and
executed a contract with a private company to administer it.174
Finally, several senators introduced a bill during the 112th session to enact “comprehensive immigration reform” which includes provisions for the protection of asylum-seekers.175
The importance of this reform momentum can be illustrated
by the theory of path dependency, first popularized by economist Paul David in the mid-eighties, wherein “individual decision[-]making early on in the path may lead to a ‘lock-in’ of a
pattern that is collectively suboptimal.”176 To illustrate the theory, David examined the series of decisions made by individual
business owners and individual typists to buy and be trained
on QWERTY keyboard models. The purchase of these keyboards led to the “lock-in”, or enduring prominence, of the
suboptimal keyboard configuration long after the technology
that required said layout had been phased out.177 The lock-in of
a given method creates “the very heavy disincentives that face
those who would wish to depart significantly from that which
has gone before,” and acts to reinforce the existing situation.178
It is significantly more difficult to alter the course after the
method becomes “locked-in” because of the “technical interrelatedness, economies of scale, and quasi-irreversibility of investment” that lead to the method becoming entrenched despite other, better, methods being available.179
173. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21.
174. Detention Reform Accomplishments, supra note 170; UNLOCKING
LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 31–32.
175. S. 1258, 112th Cong. (2011).
176. David Wilsford, Path Dependency, or Why History Makes it Difficult
but Not Impossible to Reform Health Care Systems in a Big Way, 14 J. PUB.
POLICY 251, 252 (Jul.–Dec. 1994).
177. David, supra note 23. David declared the configuration suboptimal
because winning speed-typists typically utilized a Dvorak Simplified Keyboard (“DSK”) layout and because a U.S. Naval study revealed that the cost
of retraining typists to use the DSK layout could be recouped within ten days
due to the increased efficiency of the typists on that keyboard. Id. at 332. By
the time the technological limitation that required the QWERTY configuration – jamming typebars – was obsolete, the configuration was already
locked-in. Id. at 333–34.
178. Wilsford, supra note 178, at 253–54.
179. David, supra note 23, at 334. In the QWERTY example, David describes “technical interrelatedness” as the positive feedback loop between
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The U.S. detention of asylum-seekers is similar to the
QWERTY conundrum.180 The prominence of the presumption in
favor of detention can be, in part, explained by the positive
feedback loop between the public and political responses to terrorism.181 Decisions made in response to terrorism have contributed to the prominence of mandatory detention for asylumseekers, at least until they can prove they are not a risk.182
Now it is clear that categorical mandatory detention is suboptimal, as it violates international laws.183 Despite being obsolete, the presumption in favor of detention might now be
locked-in because it is easier to continue using it than to alter
infrastructure and training to facilitate eliminating it.184

individuals choosing to learn QWERTY typing because business owners seek
to hire QWERTY-trained typists and business owners purchasing QWERTY
machines and thus seeking to hire QWERTY-trained typists. Id. at 334–35.
“Economies of scale” are represented by the decrease in “user costs of a typewriting system based upon QWERTY . . . as it gained acceptance relative to
other systems.” Id. at 335. David illustrates the “quasi-irreversibility of investments” as the point in development when QWERTY keyboards became
“locked-in” because “it became privately profitable [for non-QWERTY manufacturers] in the short run to adapt machines to the habits of men…rather
than the other way around.” Id.
180. See generally, id.
181. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2002)
(establishing DHS, changing the INS to ICE, and mainly focusing its mission
statement on the prevention of terrorist attacks through securing the homeland); Alison Mitchell & Todd S. Purdum, A Nation Challenged: The Lawmakers; Ashcroft, Seeking Broad Powers, Says Congress Must Act Quickly, N.
Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at A1 (indicating lawmakers urged strict immigration
control in response to national security concerns after 9/11, but that the momentum for control began after the 1993 World Trade Center bombings);
McFadden, supra note 8, at B4 (“[M]ost New Yorkers think illegal immigrants pose a serious threat of terrorism and believe that the [1993 World
Trade Center] bombing would not have occurred if immigration controls had
been tighter.”); Brané, supra note 31, at 150–151 (discussing security as a
common reason that countries might choose to detain). See generally, David,
supra note 23.
182. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2002)
(establishing DHS and ICE); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 302, Pub.L. 104-208 Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546
(1996) (creating mandatory detention for some classes of non-citizens). See
generally, David, supra note 23.
183. See Part I.C., supra; See generally, David, supra note 23.
184. See generally, David, supra note 23. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion, supra note 6, with Preston, supra note 7.
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Digressing from the path is not impossible.185 Radical deviations from the status quo become more likely when institutional frameworks that keep to the current path, like ICE policies
in favor of detention, meet with unpredictable external forces,
like the current momentum for U.S. immigration and detention
reform.186 Like political reform momentum, external forces in
the path dependency context are “fleeting comings together of a
number of diverse elements into a new, single combination.”187
Because of this, U.S. immigration and detention reform is at a
critical juncture where immense change is possible.188 It is essential that the United States capitalize on this opportunity
and reform in a way that brings its practice into compliance
with international law standards as this moment is fleeting
and changes in the elements, such as the inauguration of a new
political party into power, could close the window of opportunity.189 In addition to haste, it is imperative to alter the status
quo in a way that does actually bring the United States within
international law mandates because anything else could potentially lock-in a new, equally suboptimal method.190
IV. IGNORING RECOMMENDATIONS OF ASYLUM EXPERTS LEADS
TO INEFFICIENT REFORMS IN THE ASYLUM DETENTION SYSTEM
Rather than taking full advantage of the opportunity to bring
its immigration and detention system into compliance with international human rights law, the United States has constructively ignored the recommendations of asylum experts and,
thus, recent efforts at progress have failed to amount to any
significant decrease in unnecessary or arbitrary detention.191 In
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

David, supra note 23, at 334.
Wilsford, supra note 178, at 270.
Id. at 256–58, 270.
See generally, id.
See, id. at 254.
See, David, supra note 23, at 336, stating

Despite the presence of the sort of externalities that standard static
analysis tells us would interfere with the achievement of the socially
optimal degree of system compatibility, competition in the absence of
perfect futures markets drove the industry prematurely into standardization on the wrong system – where decentralized decision making subsequently has sufficed to hold it. (emphasis in original).
191. Compare Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 6, with Preston, supra note 7.
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some instances NGOs have achieved high success rates in designing and piloting programs that implement their recommendations for risk analysis and ATDs.192 However, as this
Part will illustrate, the United States has repeatedly decided
against implementing their recommendations and has instead
moved toward a suboptimal path in which reformed programs
continue to violate international obligations.193
A. The United States Takes Steps Toward Suboptimal RiskAnalysis
When ICE, DHS, and the Obama Administration pledged an
overhaul of the U.S. immigration and detention system, they
identified the need for a risk assessment mechanism that
would facilitate non-citizens in being either paroled or enrolled
into ATD programs.194 At the beginning of 2010, ICE worked
with various NGOs, led by the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (“LIRS”), to develop this “risk assessment tool.”195
The exact details of this tool have not been made public.196
However, both LIRS and Human Rights First indicated that
ICE’s tool is designed to use “objective criteria to guide decision-making regarding whether or not an alien should be detained or released; the alien’s custody classification level, if detained; and the alien’s level of community supervision (to include an ICE ATD program), if released.”197 LIRS noted that
the tool “includes mathematically weighted factors that should
signal the likelihood of threat to the community based on past

192. See, e.g., UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at appendices B, C, D,
54–61; VERA, supra note 16.
193. See, e.g., UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 29.
194. SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 17, 20. While ICE does have a system in
place that “classifies detainees as low, moderate, or high custody[, t]he primary basis for classification is criminal history[,]” and its purpose is to aid in
housing already detained aliens and not for risk analysis associated with parole. Id. at 17.
195. Detention Reform Accomplishments, supra note 170; UNLOCKING
LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21.
196. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21.
197. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 20; JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra
note 35, at 29. While LIRS did not indicate where they received the information, Human Rights First quoted email correspondence between their office and ICE officials, dated October 1, 2011. Id.
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behavior as well as of absconding for each and every individual
ICE apprehends.”198
The tool, slated for nationwide implementation in 2012, has
already garnered criticism from those to whom ICE has granted advanced exposure.199 In reviewing a pilot version, the
UNHCR expressed concern that the “tool, based on a mathematical calculation, risks becoming a bureaucratic, tick-box exercise and may lead only to artificial individual assessments
rather than real ones. It also appears heavily weighted in favour of detention.”200 Based on these assessments, it seems that
this aspect of ICE’s tool could become arbitrary and thus would
not satisfy international obligations.201 The continued presumption for detention also violates the guidance for implementing the policies advocated in the UDHR, 1951 Convention,
1967 Protocol, and ICCPR.202
Furthermore, although designed subsequent to ICE consultations with NGOs specializing in asylee and refugee protection,203 the tool apparently falls short of asylum experts’ recommendations.204 LIRS, after providing support to ICE in the
development stages of the tool, found it contains a “total absence of individualized assessment of risk for people subject to
mandatory detention. There is also no standard assessment of
risk with judicial review for people eligible for parole, such as
arriving asylum-seekers who are found to have a credible fear
of return.”205 These apparent shortcomings affect the ability of
the United States to sufficiently satisfy international standards
by, specifically, avoiding arbitrariness through individualized
assessments and judicial review.206
198. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 20.
199. Id. at 20-21, 41.
200. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 81.
201. See Part I.C., supra.
202. See UDHR, supra note 66, at art. 14(1) (III); Refugee Convention, supra note 15; Protocol to Refugee Convention, supra note 15; ICCPR, supra
note 66, at art. 9(1). See also Part I.C., supra.
203. Detention Reform Accomplishments, supra note 170; UNLOCKING
LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21.
204. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21 (“While the list [of special
vulnerability factors to be included in the tool] falls short of the recommendation from experts to ICE, the creation of a tool can be followed by improvement of it.”).
205. Id. at 41.
206. See supra, Part B.1.
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By ignoring the recommendations of LIRS and other asylum
experts involved in the development of the tool, ICE squandered a valuable opportunity to comply with international
law.207 Subsequent to viewing ICE’s new tool, LIRS published
their recommendations to ICE regarding a risk assessment
tool.208 It envisions a dynamic individualized assessment procedure that encourages release, or, if some form of detention is
necessary, the least restrictive ATD or detention procedure
necessary to mitigate the risks presented by the individual alien.209 It also allows for review of a determination should there
be a change in circumstances or risk factors for an asylumseeker.210 Had ICE adopted a risk-assessment tool in line with
these recommendations, it would allow for a greater chance of
eliminating arbitrary, unnecessary detention.211 Instead, ICE
has selected a suboptimal path that has the potential to “lockin” continuing violations of international human rights law for
future iterations of the tool.212
B. ICE Takes Steps Toward Suboptimal ATDs
In 2004, Congress approved funding for ATD programs and
ICE solicited bids for the contract to manage them.213 Various
NGOs—including the Vera Institute—bid for the contract, basing their qualifications on their expertise in refugee, asylee,
and immigration services.214 In a further example of the United
States selecting to move down a suboptimal path, ICE “gave
the contract to Behavioral Interventions Inc., a private company whose model was based on the use of electronic monitoring.”215 Behavioral Interventions Inc. (“BI”) and its parent company still hold the U.S. ATD contract.216

207. See UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 21 (stating issues with ICE’s
risk analysis tool “will severely limit its capacity to advance the efficiency of
custody and removal operations as a whole”).
208. Id. at appendices B, C, D, 54–61.
209. Id. at appendix B, 54–55.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 20–22.
212. See David, supra note 23, at 335–36; Wilsford, supra note 178; Part III,
supra.
213. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 29.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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Commonly used in the criminal judicial system, home curfew
and electronic tagging are the most restrictive ATDs, and, as
noted above, are considered by some to be an additional form of
detention.217 BI currently uses ICE’s congressional ATD funding to combine those most restrictive methods with reporting
requirements—“installation of biometric voice recognition software, unannounced home visits, employer verification, and inperson reporting to supervise participants”218—to administer a
single program: the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program II (“ISAP II”).219 While for the first time in 2009 ICE included the presence of a “needs-based case management component” as a requirement for a company to obtain the ATD contract, this appears to be an as yet unfulfilled commitment.220 In
looking at the restrictive nature of these methods, scholars
have noted, “sometimes what is called an alternative to detention may in fact be an alternative form of detention.”221
This is especially true when considering that “rather than
looking to the current detention populations and utilizing various supervision methods as a step down from unnecessary detention, [ISAP II] is seeking individuals already released into
the community to increase restrictions of liberty on more people.”222 The use of ISAP II in these scenarios remains arbitrary
and subject to the discretion of the ICE officer analyzing the
parole eligibility of an asylum-seeker.223 For example, while
“[a]liens should be assigned conditions of supervision according
to an assessment of the alien’s flight risk and danger to the
community[, in ISAP II] assignment to a[n ATD] program is
determined in part by residency,” as only those asylum-seekers
detained in close proximity to a regional ISAP II office are eli-

217. Back to Basics, supra note 14, at 53–54; Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 36–38; UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 38.
218. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 31.
219. Id. at 31–32.
220. See id. at 31.
221. Alternatives to Detention, supra note 11, at 4 (emphasis in original).
222. UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 32. This theory is additionally
supported by statements of ICE officials to Congress in explaining their 2012
budget requests: “[T]he ICE Assistant Secretary noted that the cost of ATD
per individual is higher than detention per detainee . . . because the individuals enrolled in ATD remain in the system significantly longer than those in
detention.” H.R. REP. NO. 112-91, at 53 (2011).
223. See Part I.B. & Part I.C., supra.

2012]

OVER-DETENTION

485

gible to participate.224 “ICE has not requested-and Congress
has yet to authorize-sufficient funding to expand ATD programs nationally-so that any immigration detainee who is eligible for an ATD program could be placed into it.”225
Furthermore, ICE’s plan for ISAP II “would not use ATDs as
an alternative that would decrease the use of existing detention
beds…[t]he total number of individuals in ICE custody or supervision, whether detained on Alternatives to Detention,
would increase under this plan.”226 Thus, the United States
continues to unnecessarily detain parole-eligible asylumseekers by placing them into ISAP II.227 “ICE’s plan also explicitly precludes the use of ATDs for individuals who are technically subject to ‘mandatory detention.’”228
V. POLICY BENEFITS TO UNITED STATES SHOULD IT ADOPT THE
RECOMMENDATIONS
In addition to the benefit of being in compliance with international human rights laws, there are numerous advantages for
the United States should it adopt the proposed programs.229
First, the country can maintain its status as a leader in the international community in good faith, and a stance of internal
compliance will better position the country to encourage other
nations to follow suit.230 Next, much of U.S. foreign policy in
the war on terror depends on how the country is perceived in
the international community and among individual populations.231 Because many people will still be deported, how they
feel about the process and what they say to others upon return
to their countries may have an impact on public image in areas
where the United States desperately needs support.232 A reputation of humanitarian treatment and fair dealings could go a
long way.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

SCHRIRO, supra note 18, at 20.
JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 35, at 27.
Id. at 28 (emphasis in original).
UNLOCKING LIBERTY, supra note 20, at 39.
JAILS AND JUMPSUITS, supra note 35, at 28.
E.g., Brané, supra note 31, at 170.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, there is an enormous potential for financial savings.233 Currently, it costs $95 per day to detain an asylumseeker, but only $22 per day to support that same person in an
alternative program.234 Some estimate that the disparity could
be even more extreme, with ICE overhead costs bringing detention costs up to $164 per detainee per day while some forms of
ATDs cost as little as thirty cents per day.235 While the numbers include more than just asylum-seekers, the savings associated with detaining only those who present a true risk, such
as only detaining those who have “committed violent crimes,
the agency could save nearly $4.4 million a night, or $1.6 billion annually—an 82% reduction in costs.”236
CONCLUSION
When coupled with an efficient and individualized risk analysis program, Alternatives to Detention adequately address the
risks of releasing the majority of asylum-seekers into the community during the pendency of their asylum processing.237 Instituting this combination would benefit the United States financially and in its international standing in addition to allowing the United States to comply with its international human
rights obligations regarding the detention of asylum-seekers.238
The United States should move quickly to adopt the recommendations of asylum experts, capitalizing on the current momentum for reform in the detention system and decisively ending its violations of international human rights laws.
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